

Security Council Strengthens Sanctions on Democratic Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2321 (2016)

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With Secretary-General Hailing Measures as ‘Toughest Ever’, Some Warn against Military Build-up on Peninsula

The Security Council strengthened its sanctions regime against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea today, condemning that country’s 9 September nuclear test in the strongest terms.

Unanimously adopting resolution 2321 (2016) under Article 41, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the 15-member Council noted that the 9 September test had been carried out in violation and flagrant disregard of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2095 (2013) and 2270 (2016). It had also challenged the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Underlining that measures imposed by the resolution were not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the country’s civilian population, the Council decided that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should not supply, sell or transfer coal, iron and iron ore, and that all States should prohibit the procurement of those materials from that country, with the exception of total coal exports to all Member States not exceeding \$53,495,894 or 1,000,866 metric tons, whichever was lower, between today and 31 December; and \$400,870,018 or 7,500,000 metric tons per year, whichever was lower, beginning on 1 January 2017. The text exempted transactions in iron and iron ore intended exclusively for livelihood purposes.

By other terms of the resolution, the Council prohibited Pyongyang from exporting copper, nickel, silver and zinc, new helicopters and vessels, as well as statues. It decided further that all Member States shall take steps to limit the number of bank accounts held by diplomatic missions and consular posts, as well as diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea within their respective territories. Member States should further close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or bank accounts in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea within 90 days, unless required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The Council decided further that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation with persons or groups officially sponsored by, or representing, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea except for medical exchanges. It added 11 individuals to the list of those subject to a travel ban and asset freeze, as well as 10 entities to the list of entities subject to an asset freeze. The Council also added 11 items to the list of nuclear- and/or missile-usable items and three to the list of chemical/biological

weapons-usable items of which Member States should prevent the supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Concerned that the country's nationals were working in other States to earn hard currency for use in its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, the Council called upon States to exercise vigilance over that practice. It also reiterated its deep concern over the grave hardships endured by the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and condemned the country's pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles at the expense of its own people's welfare.

Following the Council's adoption of the resolution, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that the text contained the toughest and most comprehensive sanctions regime ever imposed by the Council. He cautioned, however, that since such measures should be anchored in a comprehensive strategy for lasting peace and security, emphasizing the importance of commitment to a peaceful diplomatic and political solution. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must reverse course and move onto the path of denuclearization, he emphasized, reiterating his call on the authorities in Pyongyang to engage with the international community in addressing the grave human rights situation in the country and improving their people's living conditions.

The Republic of Korea's representative described Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme as the most serious threat to the non-proliferation regime, saying that, by adopting the resolution, the international community had made clear that it would never tolerate its pursuit of that course. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea acquired nuclear capabilities, the balance of the status quo would be broken, he cautioned, and countries in the region would have to consider how to restore that balance, either by matching Pyongyang's capabilities or by coming up with other ways to do so. Exerting non-military pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was the right way to go, he said.

Japan's representative strongly condemned Pyongyang's repeated violations of Security Council resolutions. "This resolution does not impose sanctions for the sake of sanctions," he emphasized, adding that they constituted a tool to correct its course of action. Urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions and return to the negotiating table, he said that sincere commitment and concrete steps towards denuclearization would lead to resumed dialogue. For that to happen, the international community had no option but to increase the pressure, he said, pointing out that today's resolution closed loopholes and introduced additional measures, including drastic limitations on coal imports and additional sectoral bans aimed at cutting revenues.

The representative of the United States, recognizing China's efforts in working closely with her delegation in negotiating the "rigorous and important" resolution, said the text went after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's illicit schemes, including through restrictions on hard currency and the export of monuments, and by making it harder for Pyongyang to use its diplomats to advance its nuclear programmes. However, the door remained open to negotiations, she said, adding that the United States and the Council would be ready to engage.

China's representative, while stressing the need to seek a negotiated solution within the six-party framework, noted that certain parties had increased their military presence and scaled up military exercises on and around the Korean Peninsula, thereby intensifying tensions. China strongly opposed the deployment of anti-missile systems on the Peninsula, he said, describing the current situation as "sensitive, complex and dire", and urging the parties concerned to avoid actions that might exacerbate tensions. He urged them to push forward in parallel negotiations on denuclearization, and on a peace treaty, within the framework of the six-party talks.

The Russian Federation's representative underlined that the situation in the Korean Peninsula should not provide a pretext for enhancing military capacities, and that the resolution could not be used to smother the economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to exacerbate the country's humanitarian situation.

Also speaking today were representatives of Spain, New Zealand, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, United Kingdom, Egypt, Malaysia, France, Angola and Senegal.

The meeting began at 9:05 a.m. and ended at 10:25 a.m.

Action on Draft Resolution

The Council unanimously adopted resolution 2321 (2016).

BAN KI-MOON, Secretary-General of the United Nations, said the Council had taken a strong action on one of the most enduring and pressing peace and security challenges of the present time: the nuclear and ballistic-missile activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That country had conducted two nuclear tests and at least 25 launches using ballistic missile technology since January, he recalled. It must be assumed that, with each test or launch, it continued to make technological advances in its pursuit of a military nuclear capability, he cautioned.

Noting that today's resolution contained the toughest and most comprehensive sanctions regime ever imposed by the Council, he said targeted sanctions mattered, and the latest round represented the clear and unified will of the international community. However, sanctions were only as effective as their implementation, and because some States might lack the capacity to enforce them, international capacity-building partnerships would be needed. Since sanctions should be anchored in a comprehensive strategy for lasting peace and security, commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution was also required, he emphasized.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must reverse its course and move onto the path of denuclearization, he continued, stressing the importance of not forgetting the country's acute humanitarian needs. International humanitarian assistance remained vital in safeguarding the lives of millions in need, he said, reiterating his call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea authorities to engage with the international community in addressing the grave human rights situation and improving their people's living conditions.

Statements

SAMANTHA POWER (United States) said the Council was gathered because of dangerous choices made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including its having tested nuclear devices twice in 2016. That country was determined to pose a potent threat to Member States and to international peace and security, she warned. While recognizing China for having worked closely with the United States in negotiating today's "rigorous and important" resolution, she acknowledged that the Council had been divided on many issues lately, but the unanimous adoption of new sanctions demonstrated its will. The resolution went after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's illicit schemes and broke new ground in three ways: restrictions on hard currency; on the export of monuments; and making it harder for the country to use diplomats in advancing its nuclear programmes.

"An arms dealer with a diplomatic passport is still an arms dealer," she continued, adding that the resolution also imposed measures to restrict the flow of illicit materials into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Noting that the country had made a choice to carry out systematic violations of the human rights of its own people, she said it sought total control of organized social life through such tactics as repression of the freedom of expression. When Governments violated the human rights of their own people, they demonstrated their disdain for norms that ensured the security of the international community. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must respect and ensure the welfare and inherent dignity of its people, as well as those of abducted Japanese people, she said, emphasizing that defence of human dignity was a basic demand. The door remained open to negotiations, and the United States, as well as the Council, would be ready to engage, she said.

KORO BESSHO (Japan), strongly condemning the repeated violation of Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, urged that country to abide by its international commitments. "This resolution does not impose sanctions for the sake of sanctions," he emphasized, adding that it was a tool to correct its course of action. In that regard, Japan urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions and to return to the negotiating table. Sincere commitment and concrete steps towards denuclearization would lead to resumed dialogue, he said, adding that, for that change to happen, the international community had no option but to increase the pressure. The resolution closed loopholes and introduced additional measures, he said, noting that drastic limitations on coal imports and additional sectoral bans aimed at cutting revenues would have an impact on nuclear and ballistic missile advances. At the same time, sanctions were not meant to target ordinary citizens, he stressed.

ROMÁN OYARZUN MARCHESI (Spain) said that, since violations had continued since the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016), today's text contained significant additional measures. The relevant Sanctions Committee, chaired by Spain, had worked tirelessly to implement previously adopted measures without exacerbating the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, he said, expressing trust that the latest resolution would also ensure the same. Emphasizing that sanctions were not an objective in themselves, he said it was up to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respect international legality. Nothing would give more satisfaction than the disappearance of the Sanctions Committee as a result of that country beginning to comply with international law, he added.

VLADIMIR SAFRONKOV (Russian Federation) said his delegation supported the resolution in response to the fifth nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Although that country had ignored the demands of the international community, the resolution was not aimed at ending the possibility of relaunching negotiations and seeking a political solution, he said, emphasizing it could not be used to smother the country's economy or exacerbate the humanitarian situation. Moreover, the situation in the Korean Peninsula should not provide a pretext for enhancing military capacities, he warned, strongly condemning the deployment of anti-missile systems there. The Russian Federation called upon all parties to demonstrate restraint, not to exacerbate the situation and to seek ways out of the crisis.

LIU JIEYI (China), recalling that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had conducted a nuclear test on 9 September, in defiance of objections by the international community, said today's resolution reaffirmed the need to safeguard commitments to seek a negotiated solution to the issue within the six-party framework. While the measures were not intended to have negative effects on the humanitarian situation in the country, certain parties had increased their military presence and scaled up military exercises, intensifying tension on the Korean Peninsula. Emphasizing China's opposition to the deployment of anti-missile systems there, he described the current situation as sensitive, complex and dire and urged the parties to avoid actions that might exacerbate tensions. The six-party talks should be relaunched as soon as possible, he said, adding that the parties should push forward in parallel negotiations on denuclearization as well as a peace treaty, within the framework of the six-party talks.

GERARD VAN BOHEMEN (New Zealand) recalled that the Council had met many times over the course of 2016 to discuss the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ongoing succession of nuclear and ballistic-missile tests. Considering the seriousness of those developments, it was appropriate that today's resolution provided for some of the strongest United Nations sanctions ever imposed. New Zealand had co-sponsored the text because of its concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's dangerous and provocative behaviour arguably posed the most significant threat to the Asia-Pacific region's security, he emphasized. Also, New Zealand's support of the resolution reflected its commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its coordinated and comprehensive implementation by Member States was one of the strongest signals the international community could send the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that its continued proliferation activities and disregard for international obligations would not be tolerated, and that a change of course was urgently needed.

VOLODYMYR YELCHENKO (Ukraine) welcomed the unanimous adoption of the resolution, adding that it was a comprehensive and balanced document that strengthened the existing regime and reinforced it. It confirmed the Council's intention to avoid affecting the "North Korean" people. Ukraine had always been committed to multilateral action against weapons of mass destruction, he stated, and today's vote reaffirmed the Council's firm stance of responding to global proliferation. He expressed hope that the resolution would contribute to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

CRISTINA CARRIÓN (Uruguay) welcomed the resolution's unanimous adoption which could be a deterrent to the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He reiterated his condemnation of nuclear tests and continued provocation by that country which escalated tension in the Korean Peninsula and was a violation of international law, Security Council resolutions and a serious threat to international peace and security. Expressing his country's commitment to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, he urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible way, to go back to the Treaty, as well as the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Uruguay considered the implementation of sanctions a tool by the Council to achieve a desired end, but should not be seen as a punishment.

HENRY ALFREDO SUÁREZ MORENO (Venezuela), noting his vote in favour of the resolution following the nuclear test, stressed that the holding of other nuclear tests in 2016 had led to Security Council resolutions and has affected the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Security Council must step up efforts in promoting dialogue between parties to contribute to a negotiated solution. Its goal should be denuclearization through a negotiated political solution. He urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and appealed to all parties to act in a cautious way. As well, the Council had to ensure measures of the resolution did not have a humanitarian impact on the civilian population, he said, expressing concern at restrictions imposed on basic goods could affect the population. He reiterated his appeal to Member States that had any influence on the issue to demonstrate the will to find an acceptable solution for all parties, establish a climate of trust, and relaunch the multiparty talks to resolve the differences on the Korean Peninsula.

MATTHEW RYCROFT (United Kingdom) said that, until there was genuine commitment on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to change course, sanctions would remain. Since the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had continued on its course of provocations, which, in 2016, had reached an unprecedented number. The agreed-upon mechanism on coal exports denied the country one quarter of its foreign income that could not be used for further nuclearization. The resolution also contained a condemnation of proliferation choices at the expense of the welfare of the country's people. The resolution was not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences or to affect negatively the work of organizations working in the humanitarian field. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had a clear choice: continue destabilizing behaviour or to begin to build a new future for its people.

AMR ABDELLATIF ABOULATTA (Egypt) said the unanimous adoption sent a strong signal that the latest behaviour of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would not be accepted. The latest nuclear test represented a violation of Council resolutions and undermined the non-proliferation regime. It strengthened sanctions against the country, but took into account the political process and the importance of resumption of the six-party talks. The sanctions should not have an adverse impact on the work of embassies in Pyongyang. Egypt had always warned against double standards in non-proliferation, he said, noting that a single country in his region was not a member of the non-proliferation regime, a situation which was not unacceptable. He urged the Council to carry out its responsibility in that respect.

RAMLAN BIN IBRAHIM (Malaysia) underscored the need for a comprehensive solution that would serve the interests of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the humanitarian needs of its people and urged that country to return to the negotiating table and resume peaceful dialogue under the six-party talks framework. The text's focus on safeguarding humanitarian exemptions was a crucial element, he said, noting that it would prevent unintended consequences against the livelihoods and humanitarian situation. In that regard, Security Council resolution 2270 (2016) must not be a pretext to disrupt diplomatic access and further impede the conduct of diplomatic and humanitarian activities.

FRANÇOIS DELATTRE (France) described the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's fifth nuclear test, conducted last September, as a very grave violation of the non-proliferation regime. It was one of the main challenges facing the Security Council and one of its major priorities. Welcoming the unanimous adoption of resolution 2321 (2016), he said it was a decisive step in the enhancement of sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It sent a message about the international community's unity in punishing any unacceptable questioning of the non-proliferation regime, and its goal was a radical policy change in Pyongyang. "We hope this unity will exist on every occasion when the non-proliferation regime should be in question," he said. The resolution represented a significant evolution in the non-proliferation regime, providing a strict framework with regard to the export of coal and to the banning and transfer of certain assets. It identified new tools and enhanced constraints on the use of diplomatic means for nuclear ends. While condemning the regime's logic in using existing resources to fuel its nuclear programmes, he emphasized that the sanctions were not an end in themselves, and that it was now up to Pyongyang to abandon them.

JULIO HELDER MOURA LUCAS (Angola) appealed to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to heed the international community's message by negotiating an end to its nuclear programmes, concentrating its resources on the social development of its people and denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Becoming an international pariah was detrimental to the country's people, he added.

FODÉ SECK (Senegal) said that in strengthening the sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Council had demonstrated that it was united in its will to make the authorities of that country give up their nuclear programme, which violated the non-proliferation regime. Emphasizing that sanctions were a means, and not an end, he said the humanitarian aspect of the new measures was quite telling, adding that their scope called for technical assistance and for building the capacity to facilitate effective implementation by the international community. Emphasizing Senegal's commitment to full respect for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, he called for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, including the Middle East, stressing that only through total nuclear disarmament could that goal be achieved.

OH JOON (Republic of Korea) said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear weapons programme had become the most serious threat to the non-proliferation regime. By adopting today's resolution, the international community had made clear that it would never tolerate its pursuit of that course, he said, adding that the robust measures contained in the text reinforced the sanctions regime. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had spent an estimated \$200 million on its nuclear and ballistic-missile programme in the course of 2016, which could have been used on food for its people, he noted, adding that it was paying a heavy price for its nuclear programme at the expense of its own people.

Describing Pyongyang's nuclear programme as multifaceted, he said it was a non-proliferation issue that posed the question as to whether the non-proliferation regime could be maintained, whether the international community could stand up to the challenge, or whether it would let the issue go. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme was also an issue of international security, he said, warning that, if the country acquired nuclear capabilities, the balance of the status quo would be broken. Other countries in the region must consider how to restore that balance, either by matching Pyongyang's capabilities or by coming up with other ways by which to restore it. Applying pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through non-military measures was the right way to go, he emphasized.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2321 (2016) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), and resolution 2270 (2016), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

“Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

“Expressing its gravest concern at the nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ('the DPRK') on 9 September 2016 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ('the NPT') and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

“Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

“Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,

“Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches and attempted launches of ballistic missiles, and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,

“*Expressing* continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

“*Expressing* great concern that the DPRK’s prohibited arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have unmet needs,

“*Expressing* its gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

“*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

“1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 9 September 2016 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council’s resolutions;

“2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

“3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8(e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

“4. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraph 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in Annex III of this resolution;

“5. *Reaffirms* the measures imposed in paragraph 8(a)(iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and *clarifies* that the term ‘luxury goods’ includes also, but is not limited to, the items specified in Annex IV of this resolution;

“6. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 14 through 16 of resolution 1874 (2009), and paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013), and *decides* that these paragraphs shall apply also with respect to any items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by this resolution;

“7. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in a new conventional arms dual-use list to be adopted by the Committee, *directs* the Committee to adopt this list within fifteen days and to report to the Security Council to this effect, and further *decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adopt the list within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to update this list every 12 months;

“8. *Decides* that paragraph 19 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall apply with respect to all leasing, chartering or provision of crew services to the DPRK without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

“9. *Decides* that paragraph 20 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall apply to registering vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag, and owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel flagged by the DPRK, without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

“10. *Clarifies* that, for the purposes of implementing paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), specialized teaching and training which could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to advanced materials

science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering;

“11. *Decides* that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless:

(a) In the case of scientific or technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology, or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods, the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes; or

(b) In the case of all other scientific or technical cooperation, the State engaging in scientific or technical cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes and notifies the Committee in advance of such determination;

“12. *Decides* that the Committee, if it has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessels are or have been related to nuclear- or ballistic missile-related programmes or activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, may require any or all of the following measures with respect to vessels it designates pursuant to this paragraph: (a) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall de-flag the vessel; (b) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall direct the vessel to a port identified by the Committee, in coordination with the port State; (c) all Member States shall prohibit a designated vessel from entering their ports, unless in case of emergency, in case of return to the vessel’s port of origination, or in case of direction by the Committee; (d) a vessel designated by the Committee shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006);

“13. *Expresses concern* that the personal luggage and checked baggage of individuals entering into or departing from the DPRK may be used to transport items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, and *clarifies* that such luggage and baggage constitute ‘cargo’ for the purposes of implementing paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016);

“14. *Calls upon* all Member States to reduce the number of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts;

“15. *Decides* that all Member States shall take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of the DPRK, officials of that Government, and members of the DPRK armed forces, if the State determines that such members or officials are associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution;

“16. *Decides* that all States shall take steps to limit the number of bank accounts to one per DPRK diplomatic mission and consular post, and one per accredited DPRK diplomat and consular officer, at banks in their territory;

“17. *Recalls* that, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, a diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State practice for personal profit any professional or commercial activity, and *emphasizes* accordingly that DPRK diplomatic agents are prohibited in the receiving State from such practice of professional or commercial activity;

“18. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the DPRK from using real property that it owns or leases in their territory for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities;

“19. *Recalls* that a Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, and that the exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council;

“20. *Recalls* that paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) requires all States to inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including their airports, that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is being transported on DPRK flagged aircraft, emphasizes that this measure requires States to inspect DPRK-flagged aircraft when they land in or take off from their territory, recalls also that paragraph 31 of resolution 2270 (2016) requires all States to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of aviation fuel, to the territory of the DPRK, and *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance to ensure that no more fuel is provided to DPRK-flagged civil passenger aircraft than is necessary for the relevant flight, including a standard margin for safety of flight;

“21. *Expresses* concern that prohibited items may be transported to and from the DPRK by rail and by road, and *underscores* that the obligation in paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) to inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory includes the cargo being transported by rail and by road;

“22. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, or operated, including through illicit means, by the DPRK unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes;

“23. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals from procuring vessel and aircraft crewing services from the DPRK;

“24. *Decides* that all Member States shall de-register any vessel that is owned, controlled, or operated by the DPRK, and further *decides* that Member States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph;

“25. *Notes* that, for the purpose of implementing resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution, the term “transit” includes but is not limited to the travel of individuals through a State’s international airport terminals en route to a destination in another State, regardless of whether such individuals pass through customs or passport control at that airport;

“26. *Decides* that paragraph 29 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall be replaced by the following:

“*Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to:

(a) Coal that the procuring State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

(b) Total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed \$53,495,894 or 1,000,866 metric tons, whichever is lower, between the date of adoption of this resolution and 31 December 2016, and total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed \$400,870,018 or 7,500,000 metric tons per year, whichever is lower, beginning January 1, 2017, provided that the procurements (i) involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (ii) are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals *and* unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by

resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, and *decides* that each Member State that procures coal from the DPRK shall notify the Committee of the aggregate amount of the volume of such procurement for each month no later than 30 days after the conclusion of that month on the form in Annex V to this resolution, *directs* the Committee to make publicly available on its website the volume of procurement of coal from the DPRK reported by Member States and value calculated by the Committee Secretary, as well as the amount reported for each month and with the number of States that reported for each month, *directs* the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications, *calls upon* all States that import coal from the DPRK to periodically review this website to ensure that they do not exceed the mandatory aggregate annual limit, *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 75% of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached, also *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 90% of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached, further *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 95% of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease procuring coal from the DPRK for the year, and *requests* the Secretary General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard; and

(c) Transactions in iron and iron ore that are determined to be exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution.'

"27. *Directs* the Panel of Experts, following the end of each month, to determine and transmit to the Committee, in no more than 30 days, an estimate of the average (mean) price in US dollars of coal exported from the DPRK that month based on credible and factually accurate trade data, and *directs* the Committee Secretary to use this average price as the basis to calculate the value of the procurement of coal from the DPRK each month based on the volume reported by States for the purposes of notifying all member states and making publicly available DRPK export levels on the Committee website on a real time basis as required in paragraph 26 of this resolution;

"28. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, copper, nickel, silver and zinc, and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;

"29. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, statues, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

"30. *Decides* that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters and vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

"31. *Decides* that Member States shall take the necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK within 90 days, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related organizations or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

"32. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit public and private financial support from within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade), except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

“33. *Decides* that, if a Member State determines that an individual is working on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK bank or financial institution, then Member States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the individual’s state of nationality, consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of the individual is required for fulfilment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), or this resolution;

“34. *Expresses* concern that DPRK nationals are sent to work in other States for the purpose of earning hard currency that the DPRK uses for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and *calls upon* States to exercise vigilance over this practice;

“35. *Reiterates* its concern that bulk cash may be used to evade measures imposed by the Security Council, and *calls upon* Member States to be alert to this risk;

“36. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

“37. *Reaffirms* that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) obligates all States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and *notes* that these obligations are complementary to the obligations in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016) to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;

“38. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016), and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;

“39. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2276 (2016), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

“40. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

“41. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

“42. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide additional administrative and analytical support resources needed to increase the capacity of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) and

strengthen its ability to analyse the DPRK's sanctions violation and evasion activities, to include additional funding allocated to the procurement of aerial imagery and analysis services, access to relevant trade and international security databases and other information sources, as well as support the resulting increased activities of the Committee by the Secretariat;

“43. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to include findings and recommendations in its midterm reports, beginning with the midterm report due to be submitted to the Committee by no later than 5 August 2017;

“44. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of its Panel of Experts, to hold special meetings on important thematic and regional topics and Member States' capacity challenges, to identify, prioritize, and mobilize resources to areas that would benefit from technical and capacity building assistance to enable more effective implementation by Member States;

“45. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;

“46. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the Committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;

“47. *Reaffirms* its support to the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

“48. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;

“49. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;

“50. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.”

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. PAK CHUN IL

a. Description: Pak Chun Il has served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Identifiers: DOB: 28 July 1954; Nationality: DPRK; Passport: 563410091

2. KIM SONG CHOL

a. Description: Kim Song Chol is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests.

b. AKA: Kim Hak Song

c. Identifiers: DOB: 26 March 1968, alt. DOB: 15 October 1970; Nationality: DPRK; Passport: 381420565, alt. Passport: 654120219

3. SON JONG HYOK

a. Description: Son Jong Hyok is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests.

b. AKA: Son Min

c. Identifiers: DOB: 20 May 1980; Nationality: DPRK

4. KIM SE GON

a. Description: Kim Se Gon works on behalf of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Identifiers: DOB: 13 November 1969; Passport: PD472310104; Nationality: DPRK

5. RI WON HO

a. Description: Ri Won Ho is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Identifiers: DOB: 17 July 1964; Passport: 381310014, Nationality: DPRK

6. JO YONG CHOL

a. Description: Jo Yong Chol is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID.

b. AKA: Cho Yong Chol

c. Identifiers: DOB: 30 September 1973, Nationality: DPRK

7. KIM CHOL SAM

a. Description: Kim Chol Sam is a representative for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) who has been involved in managing transactions on behalf of DCB Finance Limited. As an overseas-based representative of DCB, it is suspected that Kim Chol Sam has facilitated transactions worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and likely managed millions of dollars in DPRK related accounts with potential links to nuclear/missile programmes.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Identifiers: DOB: 11 March 1971; Nationality: DPRK

8. KIM SOK CHOL

a. Description: Kim Sok Chol acted as the DPRK Ambassador to Myanmar and he operates as a KOMID facilitator. He was paid by KOMID for his assistance and arranges meetings on behalf of KOMID, including a meeting between KOMID and Myanmar's defense related persons to discuss financial matters.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Identifiers: DOB: 8 May 1955; Passport 472310082; Nationality: DPRK

9. CHANG CHANG HA

- a. Description: Chang Chang Ha is the President of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS).
- b. AKA: Jang Chang Ha
- c. Identifiers: DOB: 10 January 1964; Nationality: DPRK

10. CHO CHUN RYONG

- a. Description: Cho Chun Ryong is the Chairman of the Second Economic Committee (SEC).
- b. AKA: Jo Chun Ryong
- c. Identifiers: DOB: 4 April 1960; Nationality: DPRK

11. SON MUN SAN

- a. Description: Son Mun San is the Director-General of the External Affairs Bureau of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE).
- b. AKA: n/a
- c. Identifiers: DOB: 23 January 1951; Nationality: DPRK

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. KOREA UNITED DEVELOPMENT BANK

- a. Description: Korea United Development Bank operates in the financial services industry of the DPRK economy.
- b. Location: Pyongyang, North Korea; SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY

2. ILSIM INTERNATIONAL BANK

- a. Description: Ilsim International Bank is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC). Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
- b. AKA: n/a

- c. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT: ILSIKPPY

3. KOREA DAESONG BANK

- a. Description: Daesong Bank is owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers' Party.
- b. AKA: Choson Taesong Unhaeng; AKA: Taesong Bank
- c. Location: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St. Potonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT/BIC: KDBKKPPY

4. SINGWANG ECONOMICS AND TRADING GENERAL CORPORATION

- a. Description: Singwang Economics and Trading General Corporation is a DPRK firm for trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the money for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad.
- b. AKA: n/a
- c. Location: DPRK

5. KOREA FOREIGN TECHNICAL TRADE CENTER

a. Description: Korea Foreign Technical Trade Center is a DPRK firm trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the funds needed to finance its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Location: DPRK

6. KOREA PUGANG TRADING CORPORATION

a. Description: Korea Pugang Trading Corporation is owned by the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, DPRK's defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military related sales.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Location: Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

7. KOREA INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL JOINT VENTURE COMPANY

a. Description: Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company is a subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation — DPRK's defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military related sales — and has engaged in proliferation-related transactions.

b. AKA: Choson International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; AKA: Chosun International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; AKA: International Chemical Joint Venture Company

c. Location: Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, DPRK; Location: Man gyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; Location: Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK

8. DCB FINANCE LIMITED

a. Description: DCB Finance Limited is a front company for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB), a listed entity.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Locations: Akara Building, 24 de Castro Street, Wickhams Cay I, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands; Dalian, China

9. KOREA TAESONG TRADING COMPANY

a. Description: Korea Taesong Trading Company has acted on behalf of KOMID in dealings with Syria.

b. AKA: n/a

c. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK

10. KOREA DAESONG GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION

a. Description: Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation is affiliated with Office 39 through minerals (gold) exports, metals, machinery, agricultural products, ginseng, jewelry, and light industry products.

b. AKA: Daesong Trading; Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Corporation

c. Location: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang City, DPRK

Annex III

Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods and Technology

Nuclear- and/or Missile-usable Items

1. Isocyanates (TDI (Toluene di-isocyanate), MDI (Methylene bis (phenyl isocyanate)), IPDI (Isophorone diisocyanate), HNMDI or HDI (Hexamethylene diisocyanate), and DDI (dimeryl diisocyanate) and production equipment.
2. Ammonium nitrate, chemically pure or in phase stabilized version (PSAN).
3. Non-destructive test chambers with a 1m or more critical internal dimension.
4. Turbo-pumps for liquid or hybrid rocket engines.
5. Polymeric Substances (Hydroxyl Terminated Poly-Ether (HTPE), Hydroxyl Terminated Caprolactone Ether (HTCE), Polypropylene glycol (PPG), Polydiethyleneglycol adipate (PGA) and Polyethylene Glycol (PEG)).
6. Inertial equipment for any application, particularly for civilian aircraft, satellite, geophysical survey applications and their associated test equipment.
7. Countermeasure Subsystems and Penetration Aids (e.g. jammers, chaff, decoys) designed to saturate, confuse, or evade missile defences.
8. Manganese metal Brazing Foils.
9. Hydroforming machines.
10. Thermal treatment furnaces — Temperature >850°C and one dimension >1m.
11. Electrical Discharge Machines (EDMs).
12. Friction stir welding machines.
13. Modelling and design software related to the modelling of aerodynamic and thermodynamic analysis of rocket or unmanned aerial vehicle systems.
14. High-speed imaging cameras except those used in medical imaging systems.
15. Truck chassis with 6 or more axles.

Chemical/Biological Weapons-usable Items

1. Floor-mounted fume hoods (walk-in style) with a minimum nominal width of 2.5 meters.
2. Batch centrifuges with a rotor capacity of 4 L or greater, usable with biological materials.
3. Fermenters with an internal volume of 10-20 L (.01-.02 cubic meters), usable with biological materials.

Annex IV

Luxury Goods

- (1) Rugs and tapestries (valued greater than \$500)
- (2) Tableware of porcelain or bone china (valued greater than \$100)

Source: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12603.doc.htm>